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I. Introduction
Communism was once a revolutionary concept.' It offered the prospect of a
"prosperous, just, and liberating society." 2 This new society promised to end
material and psychological deprivation as well as solve the fundamental economic
and political struggles of a modem world.3 Communism represented the blueprint
for civilized progress.4 No longer would private ownership exploit, enslave,
and dominate the working class.5 Collective ownership promised the way of
the future. 6 More than one-third of the world embraced some version of this
philosophy. 7 Yet, what once was touted as the great experiment that would sweep
the globe barely exists today.'
*Kirsten Storin Doty is a J.D. Candidate, May 1999, at Southern Methodist University School
of Law. She received a B.A. from the University of Notre Dame in 1996.
1. See Paul B. Stephan H, The Fall-Understanding the Collapse of the Soviet System, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. Rav. 17 (1995). The term "communism" first appeared among revolutionary groups
in Paris during the 1830s. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 165 (1993)
[hereinafter POuITICS OF THE WORLD]. The word combined two meanings: (1) a political movement
focused on overthrowing capitalist society on behalf of the working class; and (2) an outline of
society under working class rule. See id. The first definition of communism represented an extreme
form of socialism, more violent in its pursuit of abolishing private property. See id.






8. Eight years ago, in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, communist governments
fell like dominoes, in what may be considered a modern "velvet revolution." Judith Thornton,
Development of the Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law in the Former Soviet Union: Economic
Reform and Economic Reality, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 847 (1995). Such institutions as the Warsaw
Pact and COMECON Trade System were eliminated. See id. Post-communist countries began a
steady and unpredictable move toward democracy and the market economy. See id.
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While fundamental changes have taken place in Eastern Europe that affect the
global political, economic, social, and legal climate, successful transformation will
not occur overnight. 9 The ability of Eastern Europe to make a successful transition
to market economies and democracy will depend in large part upon the new legal
systems put into place.'l A "complete metamorphosis" of the law must embrace
a capitalist system involving "the sanctity of private property, freedom of entrepre-
neurial activity, freedom of contract, [and] equality of all actors in the market-
place." " Such new laws involve a total reversal of the principles of a communist
past.12 Unfortunately, communism leaves behind an incredible legacy with which
these newly emerging Eastern European countries must contend.13
The purpose of this article is to showcase the changing legal systems in post-
communist countries, specifically in the economic and business realms. The neces-
sity for new legal systems must be recognized as crucial to this region's successful
transition to democratic and free market economies. It is useful initially to briefly
highlight what comprises Eastern Europe and its history during the denouncement
of communism. Part II serves this purpose. Part III discusses the necessity and
complexity of legal reform in the region. This section reviews the unprecedented
legal, social, and economic changes as they are affected by the communist legacy.
Part IV is the focal point of the article, reviewing the areas of privatization, banking,
and bankruptcy. Part V briefly touches on other areas of needed economic legal
reform. Part VI concludes the article with an eye towards where Eastern Europe
has been and where the region is going in the twenty-first century.
II. Eastern Europe: Breaking Free From Communism
A. WHAT IS EASTERN EUROPE?
William Echikson, an author experienced in the affairs of Eastern Europe, states
that "Eastern Europe, after all, is a misnomer. ' 14 Despite the West's desire to
9. Even if post-communist countries were able to erase centrally planned infrastructure and
free prices and wages, it is absurd to think that a free market will automatically develop overnight.
See Alan S. Greenspan, Thoughts About the Transitioning Market Economies of Eastern Europe and
the Former Soviet Union, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 11 (1994).
10. Since merely eliminating central planning does not automatically establish a free market
economy, capitalist infrastructure and theoretical foundations as evidenced by laws, attitudes, behav-
ior, and various business professions, are necessary. See id. at 2-3.
11. Christopher Osakwe, Anatomy of the 1994 Civil Codes of Russia and Kazakstan: A Biopsy
of the Economic Constitutions of Two Post-Soviet Republics, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1421
(1998).
12. See id. at 1420. Communism deemed private property "obscene," freedom of contract a
fiction, and outlawed any entrepreneurial activity. See id.
13. For details on the Soviet system legacy, see generally Christopher A. Thompson, Comment,
Insuring a Brighter Future: The Emerging System of Russian Insurance Law, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L.
863, 865 (1997).
14. WILLIAM ECHIKSON, LIGHTING THE NIGHT: REVOLUTION IN EASTERN EUROPE 4 (1990) (as
cited in Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 844 (1991)
(book review)).
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package this region, its peoples, and its problems, the truth remains that Eastern
Europe was never a monolithic block. 15 Eastern Europe is comprised of many dif-
ferent nationalities, different histories, and different traditions. 16 Parts of the region
are also referred to as Central Europe. 17 This title is less a "geographic entity than
an intellectual construct." 18 The Soviet communist experiment failed to extinguish
these vast differences.' 9 This led to the exciting and sometimes frightening present
day situation in which the peoples of this region are beginning to unearth their
unique national identities.20 Despite the many significant differences, many com-
mentators suggest that the former Soviet empire can be dealt with as a whole."'
Perhaps the most unifying characteristic is that all of these countries face similar
problems in learning to function after communism. 22 The transition from a centrally
planned economy, as well as the switch from a single-party political regime, contin-
ues to be a daunting task.23 Social and economic chaos are two results brought about
by the defeat of communism.4 A system that once promoted egalitarian ideals now
experiences the reality of outright inequality. 5 The ideals, politics, and economics
15. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 845.
16. See id. A listing of the countries usually considered to be part of Eastern Europe can be separated
into three categories: (1) former republics of Yugoslavia; (2) former members of the Soviet Union's
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON); and (3) former republics of the Soviet Union.
See John J.A. Burke, The Economic Basis of Law as Demonstrated by the Reformation of NIS Legal
Systems, 18 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 207, 208 n. 1 (1996). Former republics of Yugoslavia in-
cluded Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Yugoslavia currently is composed of
Serbia and Montenegro. The former members of COMECON are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. The former
republics of the Soviet Union are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldovia, Russia, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
See id. While this listing is not exhaustive, it does provide a manageable breakdown of a majority of
the countries undergoing transition. In addition, while these countries are in no way enacting the exact
same political, economic, and legal systems, they are all moving toward a democracy and free market
economy, thus making their grouping advantageous for study. See id.
17. See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 119.
18. Id.
19. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 845.
20. See id. "Entrenched ethnic divisions permeate most developing countries, and these divisions
bear a distinctive and potentially subversive relationship to the project of marketization and democrati-
zation. " Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and
Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1998).
21. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 845.
22. See id.
23. See Burke, supra note 16, at 208. Even those persons most skilled in world affairs, politics,
and economics have difficulty in truly understanding the magnitude and complexity of the challenges
facing post-communist countries. See Csaba Varga, Transformation to Rule of Law from No-Law:
Societal Contexture of the Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 487 (1993).
24. See Michael D.V. Coco, Note, Towards Enterprisation: Shareholder Rights and Economic
Reform in Russia, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 169, 173 (1998).
25. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 845. Much of the optimism and excitement that precipitated
the "quiet revolutions" of such countries as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland in 1989 and 1990 has
been squelched by the present reality of social and economic inequality. Mark N. Salvo, Comment,
Constitutional Law and Sustainable Development in Central Europe: Are We There Yet?, 5 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 141 (1997). Political upheaval is often the result of such inequality. See id.
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of Eastern Europe are not the only areas experiencing change. Such transformation
requires a change in the legal systems of these countries as well. 26 The economic
success of these countries, in fact, is dependent upon the ability of the legal system
to encourage and further economic reforms.2 ' Since the old legal institutions were
based on dictatorship and a central economy, such systems are in many ways obso-
lete .2 The post-communist world known as Eastern Europe mustestablish a system
based on constitutionalism and the rule of law.29
B. 1989: THE AUTUMN OF PEOPLES
Beginning in 1989, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe occurred so
swiftly that some analogize it to the 1848 Springtime of Peoples.3 ° Both waves
of revolutions carry monumental significance, as one marked the beginning of
an era, and the other, the end. 3' In 1990 for example, the Polish people revealed
how deeply this revolutionary wave would sweep, as eighty percent of the nation's
citizens voted against the old regime during the presidential elections.32 It is
evident that the most visible changes took place in the realm of politics. Osiatynski
states it best when he says, "[i]t was as if frozen societies began to make up for
lost time." 33 In Poland, for example, new parties sprung up almost daily, over
one hundred in all.34
Beyond politics, the economic sphere in Eastern Europe began to experience
vast changes as well. State-owned factories and enterprises began the process
of privatization.35 In such countries as the Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary,
and Poland, property confiscated as many as forty-five years ago began to be
returned to its original owners.36 While privatization is a necessary vehicle with
which to transcend post-communist countries to market economies, such a process
is complex and slow, often limited by social factors.37
26. See Burke, supra note 16, at 208.
27. See Coco, supra note 24, at 171.
28. See Burke, supra note 16, at 208.
29. See id.
30. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 824. The 1848 Springtime of the Peoples was the first
revolution against capitalism. In 1989, the world witnessed the first revolution for capitalism in this
region of the world. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. Due to depressed conditions in many countries, the initial euphoria over the promises
of democratic change has worn thin, causing some disenfranchised voters. See Salvo, supra note
25, at 141 n. 1. Polish voters in a November 19, 1995 election provide an example. See id. Disenfran-
chised voters did not elect incumbent Lech Walesa as president, but rather communist Aleksander
Kwasniewski. See id.
33. Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 824. The Eastern European revolutions all occurred very
quickly-over the course of a few months. See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 226.
34. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 824.
35. See id. Privatization means shifting property and ownership rights from one entity to another.
See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 744.
36. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 824.
37. See Coco, supra note 24, at 171.
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While economics and politics play such a large role in modem society, in many
ways the most telling changes occurred within the minds of the East European
peoples.38 Almost overnight, people's beliefs in communism began to change.
No longer were such tenets as economic security and a right to work worth the
struggle. 39 Eastern Europe would now have to engorge itself with capitalist ideals
once forbidden and unknown. While people in post-communist countries em-
braced the change to democracy and a free market economy, deeper common
intellect and social values so completely tied to a centrally-planned economy
would prove difficult to change. 40 Famed economist Milton Friedman theorized
that pervasive belief systems would pose more of a barrier to a successful move
toward a market economy than any purely economic obstacles.4
Despite the amazingly swift and revolutionary changes taking place, Eastern
Europe was not generally marked by extreme violence and turmoil .42 There were
relatively few shootings or demonstrations, and monuments of the communist
era remained standing.43 The breaking down of the Berlin Wall is perhaps the
most vivid memory of the Western world, and it was a joyful and peaceful event.4
Since these changes were not precipitated by a loaded gun and an army of tanks,
it is often difficult to perceive the sheer depth of change in Eastern Europe.45
C. WHY DID COMMUNISM FALL?
Knowing that such profound changes have taken their course in Eastern Europe,
the next logical question becomes how such changes came about. There is neither
a simple nor a single answer to this question. Some experts on the region cite the
economic failure of communism. 46 Others also cite those nations that struggled to
win freedom before the communist machine was ready to let go. 4 Another reason
given for the fall of communism is the reign of Gorbachev, with such policies as
38. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 824.
39. See id.
40. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 2 n.3.
41. See id.
42. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 825.
43. See id.
44. On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was raised to stop the massive migration of East
Germans to the West. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 1 n. 1. Attempts to cross the wall often ended
in death, making the wall an infamous "symbol of Stalinist oppression" as well as a symbol of the
fragmentation of Europe and Germany after World War fl. Id. This symbol of the Iron Curtain
finally came down on November 9, 1989. See id. at 1.
45. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 825.
46. See id. at 827.
47. See id. Certain authors pinpoint the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980 as the beginning
of the demise of communism. See ECHIKSON, supra note 14, at 11. Others push this beginning earlier
to 1979, with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland. See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1,
at 707.
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perestroika and glasnost4 8 as well as the overall message that Moscow would not
intervene to protect the status quo of communism abroad. 49 Still other commenta-
tors suggest it was the moral and economic pressure from the West that prevented
communist hard-liners from using force against any signs of change. 50 Yet another
reason-often overlooked-is the dynamic of change within the communist party
itself." In many ways, communist elites lost confidence in themselves, their legiti-
macy, and their right to rule using whatever means necessary. 52
Never will a complete and final list be prepared concerning the reasons why
communism fell. This is true in large part because of the sheer complexity and
diversity of the region of the world that communism once held tightly in its grip.
III. The Necessity and Complexity of Legal Reform
In the western world, it is difficult to perceive how very different legal systems
of post-communist and socialist countries once were. In such countries, the legal
systems were based on socialist and communist goals ." In this sense, such systems
were used as political instruments of the government.54 The law was not used
to provide predictable rules of behavior, but instead to function as an agent in
promoting the goals of communism and socialism.55 For these reasons, legal
systems in Eastern Europe are not well suited to an open market economy .56
48. The term "perestroika" is synonymous with the word "restructuring" and may be defined
as a "deep, revolutionary renewal of all aspects of the life of Soviet society, providing socialism
with the most modern forms of organization, and disclosing to the fullest extent possible its merits
in all respects: economic, sociopolitical and ideological." POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1,
at 693. While perestroika has been used by many Soviet leaders including Stalin, it is most closely
associated with Gorbachev's reforms. See id. Glasnost reflected Gorbachev's belief in a more open
and free flow of information. See id. at 694. Gorbachev believed that without greater understanding
about the true state of Soviet affairs, the Soviet people would not be willing to follow the reforms
outlined by perestroika. See id.
49. TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN: THE REVOLUTION OF '89 WITNESSED IN
WARSAW, BUDAPEST, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE 140-42 (1990) (as cited in Osiatynski, supra note 14,
at 827).
50. See id.
51. See Osiatynski, supra note 14, at 827-28.
52. See id. at 828; see also ASH, supra note 49, at 140-42. In reference to Eastern Europe in
1989, Ash cites DeTocqueville, who once characterized the most significant element of a revolution
as "the ruling elite's loss of belief in its own right to rule." Id. at 142.
53. See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Steven R. Escobar, Comment, Cuba's Transition to a Free-
Market Democracy: A Survey of Required Changes to Laws and Legal Institutions, 5 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 379, 381 (1995).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (1994). A market-based economy is "any economic system based on private ownership
of all factors of production in which owners of capital act as entrepreneurs and coordinate their
activity through use of the market." Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central
Europe: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1129, 1129 n. 1
(1994).
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A. LAWMAKING ON A GRAND SCALE
Beginning in 1991, Eastern Europe began the unprecedented effort of lawmak-
ing on a grand scale.57 Almost overnight, former communist countries had to
disassemble their political, economic, and legal institutions, which were based
on centrally-planned economies, to erect market-based democracies. 58 Large sec-
tions of these countries' legal systems were now obsolete. 59 The legislatures,
however, were not simply free to form law and policy, as an "author is free to
write a novel.' 60 Post-communist actors have been and continue to be constrained
by history and the economy.61
Seven decades of communist rule left most legal systems ill-prepared for the
changes needed immediately after the 1991 and 1992 revolutions.6 2 In Russia,
for example, almost no law existed in areas of contract, property, and tort.63
Thus, many new laws throughout the region had to be created to fill the "legal
voids.' 64
Many of the new legal codes in Eastern Europe are described as "professoren-
recht" (the law of the professors), as most were formulated by law professors.65
Beyond full-scale codes, many of the new laws are simply individual laws.66
Despite the implementation of new laws, various old-guard laws remained in
place. In Russia, for example, old Soviet laws remained on the books from 1991
to 1993, unless alternative laws had been adopted.67 Even when new laws were
instituted, many countries, like Russia, did not repeal or amend old laws, but
only adopted new laws to be read in conjunction with the pre-transition-period
laws.68 To complicate matters further, the new laws often originate from different
sources and may provide overlapping and contradictory coverage. 69 Besides presi-
dential decrees and legislative efforts, other sources of law include such entities
as administrative agencies.7°
57. See Burke, supra note 16, at 207.
58. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 864-65; see also Burke, supra note 16, at 207. See generally
Greenspan, supra note 9, at 8.
59. See Burke, supra note 16, at 208.
60. Id.
61. See id. Communist legacies for Poland include an international debt of $40 billion (U.S.),
rampant corruption, overwhelming government mismanagement, and unusually high mortality and
morbidity rates due to everything from environmental hazards to alcoholism. See POLITICS OF THE
WORLD, supra note 1, at 707.
62. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 868.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Osakwe, supra note 11, at 1415.
66. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 865 n.5.
67. See Coco, supra note 24, at 173.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 866.
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While some new laws and decrees pass quickly, many are often premature
and experience slow implementation. 7 Other reforms are often "incomplete,
partial, and inconsistent." 72 Practicing law in Eastern Europe involves an environ-
ment of a "learn as you go" nature.73
The situations in these countries reveal that law is used as the vehicle to enact
legislatively established policies.74 Economics shape the vast legislative efforts
in Eastern Europe because restructuring the economy and promoting better stan-
dards of living assume top priority." Thus, many of the new laws enacted during
the transition phase in these countries deal specifically with economic issues.76
In this sense, it can be said that industrialized countries use legal systems to
enable economic policies.7 7 While an economic system is not the exclusive purpose
for a legal system, such systems do complement a country's chosen economic
system by "setting rules of conduct for market actors.,
7 8
B. THE HUMAN FACTOR IN IMPLEMENTING NEW LEGAL SYSTEMS
While many of the new legal systems were concocted almost overnight, imple-
mentation, acceptance, and legitimacy will take time. Even eight years after the
break from communism, many laws have not permeated the legal consciousness
of the people in this region.79 In Russia, for example, the Civil Code "functions
like a potted plant in a society which refuses to accept the rule of law as a social
value. [T]he code decorates and brightens its surrounding environment, but is
not biologically rooted in the ecological system into which it is transplanted.'"'8
In establishing a working legal system, one factor crucial to the recipe is
the "human dimension of reform." 8 A country's ability to make a successful
transition out of communism, no matter how well-conceived and written the plan
is in theory, is contingent in large part on the people.8 2 Much of the success
71. See Mikhail Ratinov, Investing in Russian Securities: Analysis of Capital Market Develop-
ment, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1772, 1776 (1998).
72. Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1327,
1327 (1998).
73. Charles T. Fee, Investing in Russia Under the Law on Production Sharing Agreements, 20
Hous. J. INT'L L. 517, 547 (1998).
74. See Burke, supra note 16, at 208.
75. See id.
76. See id. Estonia provides a good example of the theory that the majority of laws enacted in
post-communist countries are of an economic nature. See id. at 212.
77. See id. at 208.
78. Id. at 210.
79. See Osakwe, supra note 11, at 1418.
80. Id. at 1419.
81. William E. Kovacic, Recent Development: The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law
Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 1996 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 437,
438.
82. See id.
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depends on the judgment and skills of the people who will establish and implement
the new legal systems. 83 This involves having qualified accountants, auditors,
and marketing specialists. m Eastern European countries also need highly qualified
attorneys and judges to aid in the development of a modernized market economy. 5
On a more basic level, the mass population of Eastern Europe must be consid-
ered. An understanding of the expectations and processes of a market economy
must be instilled in younger generations in order to begin passing on a fuller and
more intuitive understanding of capitalism to future generations.86 This process
will take time. 87 As for older generations, they arrive out of a communist legacy
in which there was "little tolerance for individual accomplishment, business
activities, or entrepreneurship." 88 The older generations are very influential
actors in determining the success of transformation. Unfortunately, an "ingrained
popular cynicism towards governmental authorities" continues to exist in most
countries. 89 For these reasons, the communist legacy makes it hard to establish
the rule of law.9° Recent economic troubles further compound the problem of
popular acceptance of transition economies and politics.91
As a result of the problems with the human dimension of reform, the law on
the books still varies greatly from the law in practice in most Eastern European
countries.92 A mature legal culture does not yet fully exist in the region.93 Mikhail
Smolensky, of the Russian Stolichnii Bank in Moscow, describes the current
atmosphere in Russia as one where "there is no respect for the law, no culture
of law, no judicial system.' 94 Smolensky adds that before this new culture can
exist, the interim is one in which a lawless atmosphere abounds and where "brib-
ery is the grease of commerce." 95 With such words, the Russian banker seems
to understand the human factor at stake in transition. "The quality of democracy
depends heavily on the quality of the democrats," concludes Smolensky. 9
83. See id. at 438-39.
84. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 9.
85. See Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic Ideology and the
False Promise of the Free Market, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 303, 307 n.18 (1995).
86. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 12.
87. See id.
88. Sheila M. Puffer & Daniel J. McCarthy, Business Ethics in a Transforming Economy:
Applying the Integrative Social Contracts Theory to Russia, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1281,
1287 (1997).
89. Coco, supra note 24, at 172-73. See also Puffer & McCarthy, supra note 88, at 1287.
90. See Boylan, supra note 72, at 1327.
91. See Coco, supra note 24, at 174.
92. See Osakwe, supra note 11, at 1419.
93. See id.
94. DAVID REMNICK, RESURRECTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW RUSSIA 356 (1997).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 358.
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C. EASTERN EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
It is important to review what has been done in these "growing" legal systems
since their emancipation. 97 It is also important to grasp the future direction of
change. 98 Post-communist countries provide a rich laboratory for observing legal
reforms on a wide basis, and for lending insight into how the rest of the world
will be able to interact with these newly formed market economies. 99 Eastern
European states must have legal systems that are compatible with other industrial-
ized nations.'° A solid legal structure can establish confidence from creditors
and investors affecting trade and foreign investment.' 0'
It must be noted that the West has impacted the legal transformation of Eastern
Europe in numerous ways. 1 02 Such influences involve everything from configur-
ing international project financing, drafting new laws, and establishing a legal
infrastructure to assist transition.'03 While helpful, and arguably necessary, West-
ern influence raises the concern of the "transplantability of Western social and
political institutions and postcommunist state building."' t 4 Western legal systems
involve autonomic sets of rules that are separate from, but impacted by, social
standards.'O° In this sense, the legal system maintains an independent role in
forming culture. °6 As a result, Western cultures usually have "internalized a
sense of law."' '07 In addition, an institutional legal framework endures to
strengthen a culture based on the rule of law.'08
IV. Transitional Economies and Democracies Through Legal Reform
A. PRIVATIZATION LAWS: A PRECURSOR TO ALL OTHER LEGAL REFORMS
While most legal minds would agree that all areas of the law need to be re-
vamped in post-communist countries, much economic analysis tends to focus on
97. Rubin, supra note 56, at 2. Such immense changes have taken place over the past eight
years since the fall of communism, that "[ailmost everything one can say about [a] country is false
and true at the same time." Patricia A. McCoy, Levers of Law Reform: Public Goods and Russian
Banking, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45, 49 n.4 (1997) (quoting John Maynard Keynes). It is, however,
possible and useful to research how post-communist governments are enacting such drastic changes
in their legal systems on a more general level. See Burke, supra note 16, at 207. It is useful to
compare laws and philosophies with other industrialized nations. See id. at 218. Such comparison
also enables greater predictability as to what is in store for these countries. See Rubin, supra note
56, at 2.
98. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 2.
99. See generally Burke, supra note 16, at 207; Greenspan, supra note 9.
100. See Burke, supra note 16, at 218.
101. See id.
102. See Chua, supra note 20, at 4.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 5.
105. See Coco, supra note 24, at 171-72.
106. See id. at 172.
107. Id.
108. See id.
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property law, specifically the process of privatization.l°9 Reformers battle an old
resource allocation system, based on politics and social policy that created huge
inefficiencies." 0 Producers were dependent upon the government for money; the
people were dependent on the government for its system of "cradle-to-grave"
social benefits.1"' The challenge is to convert to a system based on efficient
resource allocation resonating in a competitive marketplace-shifting assets and
resources from uncompetitive entities to competitive ones.1 1 2 The word "priva-
tization" defines this complex transformation process. 113
Unfortunately, the process of privatization often involves great economic hard-
ship.1 4 Also, political and social tensions arise because of the redistribution of
income, wealth, and power.1 5 It is often difficult for reformers to garner massive
public support to vigorously carry out such a process. 1 6 Privatization is not a
swift process and can only succeed after much sacrifice. 17
By definition, privatization sounds simple. "Formally, privatization is an or-
derly and legally sanctioned transfer of ... property.".. s However, the property
to be transferred is almost all property that once belonged to "the people" indivisi-
bly. 1 9 Thus, the details and organization of such transformation into private
entities become mind boggling. In contrast to other non-Eastern European coun-
tries, privatization is not simply the transfer of ownership from state to private
109. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 2.
110. Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84, 85 (1993).
111. Id.; Joze Mencinger, Property and Constitution, in COLLECTION SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE
OF DEMOCRACY: TRANSITION TO A NEW MODEL OF ECONOMY AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL REFLEC-
TIONS, Feb. 18-19, 1993, 30, 34 (Council of Europe Press 1993).
112. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 85; see also Coco, supra note 24, at 169.
113. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 85. Privatization may be defined as a "process of
socio-economic transformation of the foundation of socialist-centralized economies by means of
transferring state assets and state enterprises to the private sector and thereby resulting in fundamental
changes in ownership relationships in the spheres of production and distribution of material welfare."
Klaudt, supra note 85, at 305 n. 8. This definition, however, does not discredit the existence of state
property. See Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance ? Securitization
of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1995).
Privatization is usually thought of as the opposite of nationalization. See id. As such, privatization
is usually considered a capitalist notion, while nationalization is considered a socialist mechanism.
See id. In reality, nationalization and privatization are merely opposites on a continuum of property
rights. See id. at 3.
114. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 85.
115. See Mencinger, supra note 111, at 34.
116. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 85.
117. See id; see also Helmut Gerlach, Bankruptcy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland
and Section 304 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, Proceedings Ancillary to Foreign Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 22 MD. 1. INT'L L. & TRADE 81, 86 (1998).
118. Mencinger, supra note 111, at 34.
119. Id. Around the world, privatization involves a difficult, lengthy, and detailed process that
is "as politically sensitive as it is technically complicated." POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note
1, at 745. Privatization may be especially difficult when the division between public and private
entities is affected by regional, ethnic, and religious complications. See id.
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sector.120 Instead, privatization is a process by which the concept of property
ownership in its most basic form is reintroduced to Eastern European societies. 121
Often, the success of privatization in a newly emerging democratic country
is used to measure the overall progress of establishing a market economy.122
Because privatization removes assets from the state and puts them in the private
sector, such a measure underscores the success of transition out from under state
control. 123 It is important to note that privatization actually encompasses a wide
range of policy initiatives. 124 Some of these basic initiatives include: (1) the
restoration of property to dispossessed former owners; (2) the sale or lease of
small entities such as shops and cafes; (3) the sale of large industrial entities;
(4) the sale of land; and (5) the sale of domestic residences such as apartments
and houses. 25 Progress occurs in each area separately and does not necessarily
transfer to success in all areas.126 Numerous specific policy goals are also pursued
in connection with privatization. 127 Unfortunately, not all of these goals are com-
patible or consistent. 128 Skeptics suggest that privatization is one way in which
the old communist elite is maintaining positions of wealth and power. 129 Political
assets can be gained by vast releases of public resources. 130 Obviously, no single
privatization scheme can achieve all policy goals and remain completely free of
misconduct. 31 Reformers may use different types of privatization to achieve
different policy objectives. 32 Difficult decisions concerning which goals to pursue
must be made.133 Compromise is a necessary element in this process. 134
To achieve success, privatization demands a tailored legal and political struc-
ture to serve as the "skeleton of a market economy." 135 The institutional elements
120. See Tony Prosser, Social Limits to Privatization, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 213, 215 (1995).
121. See id. Private property is one of the fundamental building blocks of a free market economy.
See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 85.
122. See Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words That Succeed and
Policies That Fail? 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (1995).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 5. In 1995, ninety-five percent of Russian commercial real estate remained in
control of divided local governments. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition From Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639 (1998). Much of
this property was unused. See id. at 639-40. Fragmented property rights must be united into a "usable
bundle." Id. at 640.
126. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 5. See generally Klaudt, supra note 85.
127. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 8 (for a listing of specific goals see page 9). See generally
Prosser, supra note 120, at 215.
128. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 9.
129. See id.; Klaudt, supra note 85, at 303 n.2; see also Heller, supra note 125, at 624.
130. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 9.
131. See id.
132. See id. Other reforms are often used in conjunction with privatization such as public enterprise
rehabilitation, restructuring, or commercialization, streamlined enterprise-government relations, and
market-based pricing criteria. See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 745.
133. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 9.
134. See id.
135. Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 87.
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must be in place; otherwise, the foundation of the economy will be unstable. 
13 6
The government of each country must take an active and affirmative role in
dismantling inefficient companies, finding new owners, and shifting assets.
37
Often this involves decisions between competing interest groups on social and
political levels. 138 Economists and legal scholars suggest that new institutions and
measures of reform established by these governments need to focus on creating an
overall atmosphere of easy "entry and exit of resources." 139 Such an atmosphere
encourages efficient entities and discourages inefficient entities.'4o Certain eco-
nomic areas of the law, as will be discussed shortly, promote this desired atmo-
sphere in post-communist countries, thus allowing the various methods of priva-
tization a chance to succeed.14 ' Also needed in this mix is a stable political
climate. 142
1. Private Property: Building Block of a Free Market Economy
Property law is currently one of the most confounding and controversial areas
of law, largely because of the magnitude of vested interests. 143 Under communism,
the legal concept of real estate did not exist-the state owned all land for the
people indivisibly.' In a manner once only written about in university text-
books, 145 Eastern Europe has encountered the most difficult job of defining real
property rights and ensuring conditions of a free, fair, and competitive market-
place.'4 Property law, and more specifically property rights, help to ensure that
136. See id. The goal of reform is to provide a legal system and infrastructure that ensures
individual freedom and advancement. See Thornton, supra note 8, at 848. Privatization is not simply
the removal of government and the introduction of pure laissez-faire rules. See Prosser, supra note
120, at 234.
137. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 7; see also Heller, supra note 125, at 629-30; see generally
Coco, supra note 24, at 169-70.
138. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 7.
139. Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 87.
140. See id. Bankruptcy laws are therefore a necessity in these newly emerging market economies.
Merton J. Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basis Does it Provide for a Market Economy?, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 21, 35 (1995).
141. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 87. For analysis of competition laws, see Peck,
supra note 140, at 35, and William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and
Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal,
Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995).
142. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 87.
143. See Cheryl W. Gray et al., Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 294, 295 (1992).
144. See Heller, supra note 125, at 627. As a result, land markets did not exist, which means
that no legal tools such as land registries exist in Eastern Europe. See id. at 628.
145. See Klaudt, supra note 85, at 304.
146. See Gray, supra note 143, at 295. In Russia, for example, property ownership is distorted
in favor of a small handful of economic players. See Kathryn Hendley, The Spillover Effects of
Privatization on Russian Legal Culture, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROas. 39, 46 (1995). Those
fortunate enough have reaped unbelievable profits. See id. The numbers of impoverished, however,
are far greater. Id. There does exist a middle ground in which a Russian middle class could evolve.
See id. As the Russian middle class grows and assumes property rights, they will increasingly demand
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resources are used efficiently.147 A well-instituted legal system that guarantees
protection and enforcement of property rights can raise investor confidence.'4 8
With such confidence, owners will then set out to maximize the productive use
of their property. 149 This translates into a more efficient economy on a grand
scale. 50 To maintain and spread owner confidence, legal protections and rules
regarding property must apply to all different types of property, 51 including real
property, movable property, and intellectual property. 152
Different countries have instituted multifarious privatization schemes. '53 Three
main methods of privatization are recognized: (1) voucher; (2) joint venture; and
(3) liquidation. '5 Countries also use different variations and combinations of
these methods. 155 Under the voucher system, the state distributes ownership shares
in public entities to its citizens. 156 The joint venture system usually involves
the pairing of a foreign-owned company with a state-owned entity. 57 Using the
liquidation system, the productive assets of state-owned entities are sold to the
highest bidder, while the remaining assets are scrapped. 15 8 Combining the various
methods can result in the transformation of many different-sized state entities.
clear and enforceable laws and regulations providing property protections and guarantees. See id.
at 47. The more immediate source of the demand for protection, however, are the small handful of
those whose interests are presently at stake. See id. Interestingly, at this stage the demand is "not
for laws per se, but for a basic level of stability ... allow[ing] them to make rational choices when
planning for the future." Id. Such an environment demands a stable regulatory scheme. See id. (this
is especially true in regard to taxation).
147. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 87.
148. See id. at 87-88. Property rights are rules of the game that can be defined by legislation,
administrative rules, or informal customs. See Thornton, supra note 8, at 849. Such rules regulate
how competition for valuable resources may take place. See id. Owner and investor confidence is
especially important in the context of foreign investors. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 88.
Russian law now includes a formal right to compensation for expropriation. See Heller, supra note
125, at 641 n. 101. Unfortunately, these provisions are underdeveloped. Id. Often foreigners require
a more stable and protected atmosphere than even domestic investors. See Balfour & Crise, supra
note 110, at 88. Foreigners are reluctant to invest large sums of money unless they can mitigate
some risks through legal rights and protections. See id. Hungary, for example, has the most business-
friendly laws in all of Eastern Europe. See Klaudt, supra note 85, at 319. As a result, Hungary has
experienced a flood of foreign investment. See id.
149. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 88. If property is unprotected because of absent or
unclear property rights, the individual incentive to own such property decreases. See Thornton, supra
note 8, at 849.
150. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 88.
151. See id.
152. See id. Private ownership of real property is far less disputed politically and more entrenched
in the Eastern European mindset. See Heller, supra note 125, at 638 n.86 (referring specifically to
Russian law).
153. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 86.
154. See id; Coco, supra note 24, at 174.
155. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 86.
156. See id.
157. See id. In Russia, for example, while foreign investors may take part in voucher auctions
through intermediaries, they normally choose to participate in Russian privatization in the form of
joint ventures. See Peck, supra note 140, at 34.
158. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 86; see also Coco, supra note 24, at 179-80.
VOL. 33, NO. 1
ECONOMIC LEGAL REFORMS FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN TRANSITION 203
The major controversy regarding privatization involves the speed at which
such reform should take place. 59 Some argue in favor of a rapid and immediate
privatization, referred to as the "big bang" method.' 60 Others argue for a more
modest paced transition from state to privately held property. 6'
Since the revolutionary break with communism, all countries have undergone
painful sacrifices, usually only to find themselves with reduced standards of living,
reduced production, increased unemployment, and a worsened distribution of in-
come.' 62 All Eastern European countries once declared uncompromising loyalty
and faith in building a capitalist market. 63 Each country made a staunch commit-
ment to ensure full-scale privatization of state-owned property.'64 While knowing
this would be a complex and difficult period, perhaps none truly recognized or
comprehended how devastating the transition would prove to be for some.
65
Entering 1999, most post-communist countries have had only modest success in
the realm of privatization.'66 Few countries, if any, have completely transformed
major portions of their economies. 67 Difficulties have arisen, especially in the
realm of industrial privatization, but some countries have met with success in
the privatization of smaller-sized entities.' 68 This grouping includes such entities
as retail operations and public service entities.'69 Unfortunately though, many
159. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 1; Gerlach, supra note 117, at 86 (refers to the two different
approaches as fast-track privatization and moderate-track privatization).
160. Rubin, supra note 56, at 2. The term "big bang" is often used to mean "shock therapy."
Robert B. Seidman et al., Big Bang v. Gradual Change: Macro-Economic Changes from Centralized
to Market Economies: Big Bangs and Decision-Making: What Went Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J.
435, 436 n. 1 (1995). Poland was the first post-communist country to employ the big bang approach.
See id. at 437. Poland is somewhat unique in that private ownership-in a limited sense-did exist
in the country under communism. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 88-89. The Czech Republic
provides another example of fast-track privatization. See id. at 86-87. Most other post-communist
countries followed Poland's lead. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 436. Unfortunately, the radical reforms
were not as successful as hoped. See id. at 437. All of Eastern Europe found itself in a severe
recession, and inflation continues to be a problem. See id.
161. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 2. Hungary was the only country in Eastern Europe to employ
an incrementalist policy. See Seidman, supra note 160, at 436 n.2 (incrementalism is also referred
to as piecemeal social engineering or gradualism). Incrementalism in most respects met with the
same results as shock therapy, resulting in high inflation and recession. See id. at 438-40, 442. For
specifics on Hungarian privatization, see Gerlach, supra note 117, at 87-88.
162. See Mencinger, supra note 111, at 34. Privatization to a large extent determines society's
economic winners and losers. See Klaudt, supra note 85, at 327. Under communism, unemployment
was unheard of prior to 1989. See id. at 328. Modern unemployment is generally caused by the
closing or privatization of large state-owned enterprises. See id. The private sector is not yet capable
of absorbing these workers. See id.
163. See Mencinger, supra note 111, at 34.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 5.
167. See id. at 7. Reasons for the sluggish transformation include: (1) the ambiguity of new rights;
(2) local government corruption; and (3) the lack of a legal infrastructure. See Heller, supra note
125, at 623.
168. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 7.
169. See id.
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stores still remain empty, the entrepreneurial promise of "transition from Marx
to markets" unfulfilled.17 Not all privatization efforts have been a failure; the
Czech Republic, East Germany, Russia, and the Slovak Republic have made
significant advances. 171 These are the only countries that have instituted a legiti-
mate degree of industrial privatization. 7
In trying to eradicate inefficient entities once owned by the state, politicians
in Eastern Europe walk a fine line between desperately needing foreign investment
and being criticized for selling off national resources at "fire sale" prices.173
Foreign investors often require major control in their investments and also often
focus only on those industries and entities with the most potential, leaving domes-
tic investors and entrepreneurs with whatever is left. "4 Any effort to limit foreign
investment, however, leaves only the very limited domestic market to pick up
the slack. A delicate balance must be struck between these two constituencies. '75
Another problem is that of trying to balance the goals of efficiency and social
equity. 17 6 While it is often best if control of an entity is concentrated in a small
group, outsiders often accuse such groups of being the old party officials who are
now beneficiaries in a new system of corruption. 17 7 The very structure of the priva-
tization process gives tremendous control to politicians who are not free from con-
flicts of interest. 178 Thus, ensuring fairness in the process is very difficult, espe-
cially when the mere perception of unfairness by the citizenry can cause difficulties.
2. Case Study: Russia
The Russian government launched a massive privatization program in July of
1992 with the Program for Deepening the Economic Reform in the Russian
Federation.' 79 The document alone is roughly 280 pages, discussing the basic
goals of Russian privatization: (1) liberalization and stabilization of the monetary
170. Heller, supra note 125, at 622-23. Many stores remain empty because title to the land is
unclear or the property is still occupied by defunct state-run entities, See id. at 634.
171. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 8. The Russians, for example, implemented privatization
reforms at a pace rarely matched by other Russian reforms. See Peck, supra note 140, at 22.
172. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 8.




177. See id. Preferences for existing managers and workers in privatization schemes across Eastern
Europe have been criticized by the populace. See Prosser, supra note 120, at 230. Businesses trans-
ferred to management without any system of centralized control resulted in many transfers at "artifi-
cially reduced prices" to the benefit of former managers and workers. Id. Such practices outraged
many citizens and discredited the privatization process to an extent. See id.
178. See Heller, supra note 125, at 624.
179. See Georgi G. Angelov, Legal Framework of Privatization in Russia, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 207 (1993). Russian politics dictated the speed with which Russian privatization occurred.
See Peck, supra note 140, at 22. The director of privatization, Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly
Chubais, cited the failed coup attempt in August of 1992 as the impetus for large-scale privatization.
See id.; see also Coco, supra note 24, at 175 (citing Angelov, supra).
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system; (2) institutional changes regarding state-owned entities; (3) structural
changes; (4) foreign investment policy changes; and (5) social policy changes.I"0
Twenty-five thousand large firms were ordered by the government to transform
themselves into joint-stock companies. 18' This conversion, also known as "dena-
tionalization," was to begin the process of transforming state-owned entities into
newly formed companies independent of the state. ' 8 2 Each company was required
to devise a plan for share distribution.
18 3
Russian law makers enacted the Russian Law on Privatization of State and
Municipal Enterprises (RLP) to guide parts of the process and to aid in implemen-
tation.8 4 Months later, the government issued 148 million vouchers' 85 to the
people of Russia, each worth the nominal value of 10,000 rubles. 8 6 Auctions
then took place in which people could either choose to use their vouchers for
shares or sell them for cash. '87 The equivalent dollar price for the average voucher
was ten dollars. 88
In order to pass these privatization laws, the laws were altered somewhat in
favor of worker ownership.' 8 9 Companies undergoing share distribution were
180. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 207.
181. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 13. To account for the vast range of sizes of state entities,
the program divided all entities into three different groups. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 213.
182. Angelov, supra note 179, at 210.
183. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 13. Because the privatization process was highly decentralized,
approval of entity share distribution plans occurred almost automatically. See Peck, supra note 140,
at 23.
184. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 210; see also Coco, supra note 24, at 175-76. The RLP
called for an initial three-year program of privatization. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 210. The
law outlined those sectors crucial to society in which the state would maintain limited control. See
id. at 212.
185. While the amounts of the individual vouchers are rather nominal, such a vast system does
have its advantages. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 219. Each of the millions of Russian citizen
is given an "equal start" under the new economy. See id. The hope is that such involvement will
encourage the development of an extensive middle class and help compensate for a lack of savings
by the people. See id. The voucher system is not without its drawbacks, in that vouchers may simply
replace ambiguous state ownership with ambiguous and widespread citizen ownership. See id. In
this sense, the people still have little control over management issues. See id. Lastly, voucher systems
can be manipulated for fraudulent purposes. See id.
186. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 13; Coco, supra note 24, at 178 n.42 (10,000 rubles is the
rough equivalent of $25). See also Peck, supra note 140, at 26.
187. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 13. The Yeltsin government wanted to make the results of
privatization irreversible. See Peck, supra note 140, at 23. The government wished to create national
pride in stock ownership. See id. Those citizens opting to sell their vouchers may have sold them to one
of the 500-plus investment funds established for this purpose. See id. at 26. Investment funds acquired
one-sixth of all vouchers. See id. Investment funds are, however, limited by law to owning no more
than fifteen percent of any one company. See id. at 34. Vouchers were very popular because of their
instant profit potential as evidenced by trading on the Moscow Commodity Exchange. See id.
188. See Rutland, s'upra note 122, at 13. Because Russians received vouchers virtually for free,
and since no imbedded notion of private property existed, critics worried that the majority of Russians
would not know what to do with their vouchers. See Ratinov, supra note 71, at 1773.
189. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. The Russian government instituted three options, entitled
variants, for enterprise committees to choose from in establishing a share distribution plan. See Peck,
supra note 140, at 25. Variant I involved larger entities being reorganized as corporations in which
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allowed to reserve fifty-one percent of their shares to sell to its workers and
managers.'0 Between seventy-five and eighty percent of companies decided to
take part in the worker buy-out option program.
19
'
The laws also created a Russian Property Fund to house any state shares in
privatized companies.'92 The fund generally held twenty percent of the shares
in each company, leaving roughly twenty-nine percent to auction off to the general
public. 193 Unfortunately, such a breakup of the percentages provided little incen-
tive for companies to sell shares and risk losing insider control.'94 As a result,
managers aggressively sought shares from their workers. 95 Russian reformers
began to worry that not enough shares were being made available to cover the
number of vouchers issued. 9 6 Pressure was exerted on companies to continue
to sell shares.' 97 To monitor such massive transformation, Russia developed a
two-tier agency regulation system.198
In June of 1994 the voucher program was terminated. 199 Over 24,000 companies
had been converted into joint-stock entities, and over 11,000 voucher auctions
workers would receive twenty-five percent of the corporation's shares. See id. Roughly twenty
percent of Russian enterprises have chosen Variant I. See id. Variant III, in contrast, involved mostly
management ownership of shares based on performance criteria. See id. at 26. Russian enterprises
have seldom used Variant III. See id. See also Coco, supra note 24, at 176-78 for specifics regarding
Variants I and III.
190. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. Variant II, as stated, allows insiders a great amount of
control by reserving fifty-one percent of the entity's shares for purchase by management and workers.
See Peck, supra note 140, at 25. In addition, by combining vouchers, managers and workers could
buy the fifty-one percent holding without any cash outlay. See id. at 26. Because of such benefits,
it comes as no surprise that Variant II was the most widely chosen option. See id.; see also Coco,
supra note 24, at 177 (detailed specifics regarding Variant II).
191. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14; Peck, supra note 140, at 26.
192. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. One tool used to maintain government control is that
which is referred to as a "golden share." Prosser, supra note 120, at 219. The golden share is a
share owned by the state in a privatized entity so as to give the entity some breathing room by
removing the threat of a hostile takeover. See id. In this way, the state can maintain a degree of
control over an industry it deems to be of strategic importance to the country, such as telecommunica-
tions, energy, or transportation. See id. at 218; see also Baev, supra note 113, at 20-24, 38-39.
193. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. As of 1995 data, Russia has the highest proportion of
citizen stock ownership of any market economy. See Peck, supra note 140, at 23. Approximately
forty million Russians own stock. See id.
194. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14.
195. See id. Managers and employees exert a great deal of political power through strong lobbies.
See Peck, supra note 140, at 23. These two groups were in many ways considered the two most-needed
supporters for privatization reforms to pass. See id. at 24. While some criticize the manager-worker
stronghold, the long-term results of such a coalition may benefit and further the implementation of
a market economy. See id. at 31. If, and it seems likely, managers will continue to increase ownership
and control over their businesses, such managers may eventually become majority owners. See id.
As such, managers will increasingly focus on profit maximization, which is exactly what a market
economy demands. See id.
196. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. Russian officials also worried about enterprises dominated
by management and workers. See Peck, supra note 140, at 24.
197. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14.
198. See Angelov, supra note 179, at 212.
199. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14.
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had taken place. 200 In total, nearly 100,000 state-owned entities changed owner-
ship form, with approximately 12,500 turning into private entities.20 ' Even after
this extensive voucher system, roughly forty percent of the larger state-owned
entities continued under state control. 202 Smaller-sized entity conversions met
with greater success, seventy-three percent being transferred.2 3
Shortly after the termination of the voucher system, Russian reformers imple-
mented a second round of privatization schemes. 2°4 Many suggest this phase of
privatization caused the truly fundamental changes necessary for radical transi-
tion. 20 5 The main purpose of these laws was to sell the residual share holdings
of the government from the first strands of privatization and raise much needed
capital for the government budget.2°6 Cash auctions and investment tenders were
the two main vehicles used to achieve this end.20 7 The Russian government aimed
to raise $1.9 billion in 1995 alone, but fell short of this goal.20 8
As previously noted, Russian privatization, when compared to most of its
neighboring countries, met with substantial success.2 °9 Private citizens now con-
trolled methods of production on an unprecedented level.210 Privatization snow-
balled to include most sectors of the economy and has resulted in a rebirth of
Russian private property. 21 ' The boom in new enterprises resulted in over forty
million Russian shareholders-an unheard of number by Russian standards. 1 2
Such successes resulted despite pessimistic predictions.
Problems still arose and continue to plague efforts today. For example, unlike
in the Czech Republic, Russia was not able to implement a computerized voucher
200. See id.
201. See Ratinov, supra note 71, at 1772.
202. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14; see also Baev, supra note 113, at 15, 32.
203. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 14. These smaller entities were handled on a separate
privatization scheme and were bought in large part by past employees for nominal prices. See id.
See also Heller, supra note 125, at 648 n.128.
204. See Ira W. Lieberman & Rogi Veimetra, The Rush for State Shares in the "Klondyke" of
Wild East Capitalism: Loans-For-Shares Transactions in Russia, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 737 (1996).
205. See Ratinov, supra note 71, at 1772.
206. See Lieberman & Veimetra, supra note 204, at 738. Many of the residual share holdings
of the government are in the communications, defense, energy, mass media, and transportation
sectors. See Peck, supra note 140, at 36.
207. See Lieberman & Veimetra, supra note 204, at 738.
208. See id. The Russian Government is in dire need of additional funds. The Chairman of the
Duma Economic Policy Committee, Sergei Glazyev, lamented about the financial state of affairs of
his country, saying "we have no money for health or education but we are giving away shares in
Russian oil companies. It's crazy." Peck, supra note 140, at 36.
209. See generally Rutland, supra note 122, at 5-9. Some commentators suggest that over fifty
percent of state-owned entities had been converted into private ownership through the voucher program
in just two short years. See Lieberman & Veimetra, supra note 204, at 737.
210. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 868.
211. See id.; Ratinov, supra note 71, at 1772 n.2.
212. See Ratinov, supra note 71, at 1773.
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system." 3 This made it impossible to create a national bidding system, which
opens the door to possible regional manipulations.1 4 In addition, the worker
buy-out option, while positive in some respects, excluded many investors from
taking part in meaningful management. 2 5 This option was often used to generate
income while retaining core control of the entity.2t6 Thus, Russian companies
did not change hands as much as expected or desired. 1 7 As a result, Russian
privatization is considered inequitable, as the law and system of insider prefer-
ences have "largely been a victory for enterprise insiders and the industrial
lobby." 21 8 Many Russians have become greatly disillusioned by the process.21 9
In summary, skeptics suggest that privatization has had only a slight impact
on the macroeconomic problems facing Russia. 220 The system did not necessarily
stop resource allocation to inefficient entities, nor did it mandate corporate restruc-
turing. 221 At present, Russia finds itself in the midst of an "incomplete reform." 222
Competition for assets is still underway, and the process of privatization is by
no means complete.223 Despite such difficulties and failures, successes must be
acknowledged.224 To its credit and benefit, Russia has successfully dismantled
a good portion of its old administrative organs and aggressively begun the conver-
213. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 15. For general information regarding Hungarian privatiza-
tion, see Gerlach, supra note 117, at 87.
214. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 15.
215. See id. In addition to the absence of meaningful control, outside investors, often characterized
as minority shareholders, rarely receive dividends. See Peck, supra note 140, at 32. Russian businesses
rarely pay out dividends to stockholders, instead choosing to use the money to increase worker wages
and managerial salaries. See id. Minority stockholders are without securities laws to protect their
interests. See id. at 33. In addition to having few legal rights, minority stockholders are rumored
to have been bullied and threatened at meetings to comply with majority interests. See id. The result
of such terrible treatment of minority stockholders is reduced interest by outsiders to invest in
businesses with such reputations. See id.
216. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 15.
217. See id. It is sometimes difficult to track enterprise ownership as enterprises are not required
to report the distribution of shares. See Peck, supra note 140, at 26.
218. Coco, supra note 24, at 181.
219. See id.
220. See Rutland, supra note 122, at 15.
221. See id.
222. Thornton, supra note 8, at 847.
223. See id. Russian privatization is not complete, as Russian businesses continue to encounter
major restructuring difficulties. See Peck, supra note 140, at 27. Restructuring involves the process
in which the outputs of Russian businesses are "brought in line with the demands of a market
economy. " Id. Currently, there is an enormous mismatch between output and demand. See id.
Unfortunately, an economy that once centered around military and heavy industry production (the
legacy of the Communist planned economy) is neither easily nor quickly restructured and brought
into balance. See id. One reason for the retarded rate of restructuring is the reluctance of old as
well as newly formed businesses to reduce their work forces. See id. at 29. Historically and socially,
it is difficult to lay off workers. See id.
224. See Thornton, supra note 8, at 847; see also Peck, supra note 140, at 36.
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sion process. 22 In addition, a new entrepreneurial and property-driven attitude
is beginning to appear amongst its people.226
B. ECONOMIC REFORM: BANKING TO BANKRUPTCY
Certainly the transition from communism to capitalism and democracy requires
unprecedented changes in all areas of the law. In fact, many areas did not even
exist under communism, as capitalist notions such as competition and profit
maximization held no meaning in the popular psyche. Regarding the business and
economic realm, two areas of law prove to be especially important for transition-
banking and bankruptcy.
Banking laws are the first crucial subject for post-communist economic reform.
Before the revolutions of 1991 and 1992, the banking sectors in this region served
at the behest of the state, usually subsidizing inefficient and failing entities. New
banking schemes must embrace capitalist ideals and become independent systems
supporting efficient market actors. The second area needing reform is that of
bankruptcy. In theory and practice, bankruptcy is a newborn concept in Eastern
Europe-because communism had no need for such a process.
As post-communist countries continue to struggle with transition, economic
law reforms, especially in the areas of banking and bankruptcy, become most
important. Interestingly, banking and bankruptcy represent two opposites on a
business spectrum. One side represents new growth and financial support, while
the other side represents the end of inefficient and unsuccessful ventures. An
in-depth review of both areas of legal reform is necessary to highlight their
importance in transition.
1. Banking Laws
A country's economic and financial stability depends greatly upon its banking
system.227 Such a banking system requires a reliable monetary system and a stable
banking structure.228 In order to make the transition to a market economy, the
banking structure relies on a bank's ability to serve as a financial intermediary
between creditors and debtors, its ability to encourage payments between newly
emerging financial actors, and its ability to supply the maximum capital necessary
to finance infrastructure improvements and investments needed in order for these
225. See Thornton, supra note 8, at 847.
226. See id. Other areas of the law reinforce Russian privatization efforts. The Russian Civil
Code of 1994 provides one such example. See Osakwe, supra note 11, at 1421. The Code "treats
private property as one of the cornerstones of a market economy, and proceeds to give a ringing
endorsement to the concept of private ownership." Id.
227. See Susanna V. Pullen, Comment, United States Foreign Banking and Investment Opportuni-
ties: Branching Out to the Russian Federation, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 159, 161 (1995).
228. See id.
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countries to compete globally. 229 Post-communist countries will experience legal
instability if: (1) gaps in the law are not filled; (2) a poor reporting system is
not streamlined; and (3) the existing complex bureaucracy is not exterminated.23°
Even today, most post-communist banking systems remain underdeveloped.231
Such systems lack the degree of competition and regulation of efficient and modem
banking systems. 232 Despite the slow progress, most countries indicate a willing-
ness to continue to reform their inefficient systems. 233
In a free market economy, stability and efficiency usually require the creation
of a central bank to guide a commercial banking system.2M Such a system involves
numerous branch banks, which keep the nation's wealth, create lending, and
control inflation through the interest rate.235 Independent management is another
aspect of a central bank system .236 Many post-communist countries not only look
to foreign models for guidance, but in many cases have direct involvement from
foreign advisors.237
In instituting new banking systems, post-communist countries have employed
two basic models, that of the United States and that of the Federal Republic of
Germany. 238 The German approach, which many commentators suggest is used
more frequently, involves the creation of universal banks.239 Such banks render
a broad range of services including taking deposits, making loans, underwriting
securities issues, performing mutual fund transactions, making investment recom-
mendations, dealing in collectible coins and precious metals, and facilitating real
estate sales . 2'o Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania have followed
229. See William L. Horton, Jr., Note, The Perils of Universal Banking in Central and Eastern
Europe, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 683, 684 (1995).
230. See Pullen, supra note 227, at 161 n.ll.
231. See id. at 162. Before 1989, post-communist countries had no effective modern banking
system. See John Linarelli, The European Bankfor Reconstruction and Developmentand the Post-Cold
War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 374 (1995). To institute a market economy, Eastern
Europe has had to develop and reconstruct an all-encompassing banking system in a very short period
of time. See id. at 375.
232. See Pullen, supra note 227, at 162.
233. See id. The willingness to convert to market economies can also be seen by the various
organizations that exist to aid in the transition. See Linarelli, supra note 231, at 376. The European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is one such organization. See id.
234. See Pullen, supra note 227, at 162. Eastern European banking systems in general were very
primitive. Under communist central planning, the extent of the domestic banking system was little
more than a single bank used to house people's savings. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 11.
235. See Pullen, supra note 227, at 162.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 164. One example of such foreign advice is the U.S. Federal Reserve's involvement
in Russia. See id. Along with a few major commercial U.S. banks, the Federal Reserve founded
an advisory group named the Russian-American Bankers Forum. See id.
238. See Horton, supra note 229, at 684.
239. See id.
240. See Michael Gruson & Uwe H. Schneider, The German Landesbanken, 1995 COLUM. Bus.
L. REV. 337, 340; see also Horton, supra note 229, at 684.
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the German model. 241 Most of Europe follows this model in one way or another.242
The U.S. model divides commercial banking functions and investment banking
functions between entities.243 Hungary has chosen to follow the U.S. model.2 4
Both the German and U.S. models have proponents and critics. 245 Eight years
after initial integration of the new banking systems, both models continue to
experience new problems mixed with occasional successes.
Since the German model is more pervasive in new banking systems in post-
communist countries, it is useful to outline the benefits and drawbacks associated
with this model. The first benefit associated with the German universal model
is the increased stability banks gain when they diversify their lines of business.
246
A second benefit is increased efficiency due to economies of scale and scope.247
This means that many skills in banking apply across the board to different areas,
making it efficient for one firm to service all needs under one roof.24 Supporters
of a universal banking model cite a third benefit, that of reduced regulatory
CoStS. 249 Since all banks provide the same services, both the banks and the regula-
tors only have to consider one set of rules.2 50 A fourth benefit created by the
German model is that such a system can increase the likelihood of finding alterna-
tive private solutions to individual businesses' economic needs,25' the lender bank
having an interest in the ailing business.252 Such an interest might cause the lender
241. See Horton, supra note 229, at 684. One of the reasons for this model's appeal is the
geographical proximity of the Eastern European region to the Federal Republic of Germany. See
id. A second reason for this model's appeal is the strength and rapid accession of this model during
the early nineteenth century. See id. at 685.
242. See id. European countries such as France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom all
allow some version of universal banking as advanced by the German model. See id. at 686 n.8. For
specifics on German and U.K. banking systems, see Bill Shaw & John R. Rowlett, Reforming the
U.S. Banking System: Lessons from Abroad, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 91, 111-17 (1993).
243. See Horton, supra note 229, at 684. For a general overview of U.S. banking, see Shaw &
Rowlett, supra note 242, at 99-105.
244. See Horton, supra note 229, at 684.
245. See generally id. at 683.
246. See id. at 686. See also Gruson & Schneider, supra note 240, at 340, 343-44. See id. at
340 n.2 for limits on activities in which banks may engage. Critics warn that investment banking
is demonstrably much riskier than commercial banking, a fact that calls into question the stability
of such banks. See generally POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 302-04.
247. See Horton, supra note 229, at 687.
248. See id. at 688. Critics suggest that the universal model is not the only model to achieve
economies of scale. See id. Banks of different specialties can simply associate with one another in
a type of "narrow banking." Id. (quoting Robert E. Litan, Commentary, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
229, 230 (1993)).
249. See id.; see also Gruson & Schneider, supra note 240, at 344. See generally Gerhard Wegen,
Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for an Integrated Europe, 60 FORHAM L.
REv. 91, 93 (1992) (different types of regulations).
250. See Horton, supra note 229, at 688. For general German regulations, see Edward L. Rubin,
Discretion and its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1299, 1324-25 (1997).
251. See Horton, supra note 229, at 688.
252. See id.
SPRING 1999
212 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to be more flexible in allowing longer adjustment periods than a disinterested
third party lender. 23 A final benefit offered by the German model is its ability
to increase banks' incentives to monitor management in businesses in which they
retain equity.254
Critics of the German model cite three main drawbacks in addition to those
mentioned in the footnotes. As already hinted, a universal banking system involves
increased risks associated with securities underwriting and other non-traditional
services that make these already fragile banking systems even more unstable.255
Another negative aspect involves decreased competition in the marketplace for
financial services.25 6 A final drawback extends from the fact that the universal
system promotes a tight network of banks and businesses, a situation in which
insider trading may be too seductive to resist.257
Roughly a decade after emerging out of the chaos of communism, many Eastern
European banking systems still face basic challenges.258 Many banks in the region
are still unable to adequately, if at all, allocate credit and turn a profit.259 Some
of the regions' banking systems are not yet even functioning at a minimum level. 260
Commentators suggest that by lending to inefficient state-owned entities, such
countries as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and even Poland retard their rates
of transition to market economies, endangering these newly emerging states.26'
Even in 1999, Eastern European banking faces enormous problems in establishing
253. See id. at 689. Faultfinders suggest that this scheme sets up the potential for "throw[ing]
good money after bad." Id.
254. See id. at 690. But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance
and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States,
48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 74-76 (1995); cf. James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider's Look into the Regulation
of Insider Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 1, 7 (1996).
255. See Horton, supra note 229, at 690. Proponents of the German model do not find this mixture
dangerous. See Rubin, Discretion and its Discontents, supra note 250, at 1324.
256. See Horton, supra note 229, at 691.
257. See id. See Freis, supra note 254, at 30-31, for examples of German problems regarding
insider trading. Antitrust laws may be able to address some of these concerns. See Horton, supra
note 229, at 691. See generally Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1913-14 (1996).
258. Prior to the revolutions beginning in 1989, Eastern European countries were very intercon-
nected. See POLITICS OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 120. Given this history, the economic failures
felt by each country during the transition only reinforced and multiplied the region's troubles as a
whole. See id.
259. See Horton, supra note 229, at 702 (citing Mark M. Nelson, East Europe's Banks Remain
State-Run, Despite Grand Plans for Privatizations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1994, at A18 (quoting
Karla Brom, financial services specialist, Institute for EastWest Studies, Prague)).
260. See id.
261. See id. at 703. To their benefit, such countries as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland
have instituted numerous banking laws in line with the European community's directives. See Wegen,
supra note 249, at 95.
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viable and competitive systems.262 Obviously, it is very difficult to create new
financial systems from scratch.263
a. Case Study: Russia
Russia, like most other countries in the region, still teeters between "economic
transformation and civil strife.' -264 Although haphazardly, real incomes are finally
rising, and both inflation and unemployment are finally falling.265 Unfortunately,
much of the progress is both too late and too little.266 Such progress is also by
no means complete. 26' Having undergone painful market reforms, and with the
future looking much the same, Russia faces such citizen upheaval as was evidenced
by the near victory of a communist slate during the 1996 summer elections.26s
Russia's economic and political stability remains questionable. 269 This uneasy
atmosphere in Russia prompts the question of whether commercial law reforms,
intended to instill market discipline in Russia, were too late.270 Surprisingly,
both "big bang" theorists, as well as gradualists, agree that it would have been
impossible for market-oriented laws to be merely "adopted off-the-rack from
Western legal codes," thus ensuring a quicker implementation.27'
The Russian Federation under perestroika had enacted major reforms (includ-
ing bank privatization legislation) even before the fall of communism.272 The
1990 legislation, however, had very little impact on the banking system.273 Such
laws are cited as failing to stop self-dealing among bank directors and sharehold-
262. See Horton, supra note 229, at 703.
263. See id. For examples of Polish and Hungarian banking laws, see William M. Berenson,
Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banking, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 337, 345-49
(1995) (book review).
264. McCoy, supra note 97, at 45.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. See generally Greenspan, supra note 9.
268. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 45.
269. See id. It is vital for post-communist countries to establish stable economies because this is
closely intertwined with political stability. See Linarelli, supra note 231, at 374.
270. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 45. It has been difficult for post-communist countries like
Russia to switch to a mindset in which financial losses translate into penalties. See id. at 46 n. 1.
To achieve this end, measures such as legally-mandated loan underwriting standards, interest rate
deregulation, restrictions on insider loans, and collateral forfeiture laws should be enacted. See id.
271. Id. at 45-46. Russia is unique in that its people lived under communist rule for the longest
time and therefore have the least entrepreneurial heritage or experience. See id.; see also Greenspan,
supra note 9, at 11-12. Surprisingly, public opinion polls in Russia reveal a high acceptance of
democratic ideals and values for a society that has no history of political democracy. See POuTICS
OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 805. However, the Russian people still exhibit a low level of
attachment to political pluralism. See id.
272. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 45.
273. See id. For the history of Russian banking, see Peter Y. Malyshev, Practitioner's Perspective:
Applications by Russian Banks to Establish Representative Offices in the United States, 9 TRANSNAT' L
LAW. 159, 208-13 (1996).
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ers.274 This atmosphere captures the Russian philosophy toward finance under
communism,275 which was that banks operated merely to subsidize state priorities
regardless of their productive value.27 6 Thus, a major challenge in the transition
to a capitalist system of banking has been to establish a system that redirects
resources to their optimum use.277 To do this requires extreme alterations of
expectations. 278 Fortunately, the situation, while not perfect, has changed drasti-
cally, and new legislation has been drafted and implemented to revamp and
redirect the Russian banking system.279 While these new laws have not been
without opponents, banking reforms have survived so far.2s
In summation, the major reforms of 1990 tried to overhaul the entire Russian
banking system by attempting to create a two-tier competitive banking system.28'
Much like in the United States, under this system a central bank focuses on
regulating the interest rate and overall credit extension, while lower-level com-
mercial banks handle the loan and deposit transactions. 82 No matter how well
written, such reforms are likely to encounter major implementation problems.283
After the fall of communism in 1992, Russia again looked to its banking system
274. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 45.
275. See id; see also Greenspan, supra note 9, at 11.
276. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 45.
277. See id. at 47. This challenge is similar to those faced in the attempt to privatize such institutions.
See generally Balfour & Crise, supra note 110, at 85.
278. See McCoy, supra note 97, at 47. Under communism, expectations were that the government
would always subsidize businesses, no matter what their financial condition, in the name of the public
good. See id. This expectation is completely opposite to the free market tenet that businesses should
not receive credit unless they have the ability to repay their loans. See id.
279. See id. at 46. New legislation has begun to address such problems as: (1) conflicts of interests;
(2) closing down failed banks caused by rampant acceptance of delinquent loans; and (3) carefree
loan subsidies to former state-owned entities. See id. at 47. For additional ideas on reform, see Paul
Anawalt, Russia's Sberbank and a Fresh Look at the Glass-Steagall Act, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
344, 345 (1996).
280. In 1990, when bank privatization legislation was enacted, prices were still controlled and
the banking constituents saw no gain for them by halting subsidies. See McCoy, supra note 97, at
48. Insolvent state-owned entities could not qualify for credit under the new laws, and solvent entities
did not know how to compete for funds under the new system, rather than the old system of lobbying
the government for funds. See id. Thus, the general consensus was against market-based financing
and in favor of subsidies. See id. The fall of communism did not change the constituency mindset
easily, and many opposed the reforms. See id. Slowly and gradually, the new reforms were embraced.
See id. at 47.
281. See Inna Vysman, Note, The New Banking Legislation in Russia: Theoretical Adequacy,
Practical Difficulties, and Potential Solutions, 62 FORDHAM L. Rv. 265 (1993) (Vysman clearly
details the newly established Russian banking system. Vysman also discusses the theoretical, practical,
and potential problems and solutions for Russian banking. While these materials are beyond the
scope of this article, they are excellent for more in-depth study). See also Malyshev, supra note
273, at 212-13.
282. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 265. One difference between the U.S. and Russian banking
systems is the fact that Russia has only a national banking system as opposed to the United States,
which has a co-existent national and state banking system. See id. at 265 n. 1. See generally Shaw
& Rowlett, supra note 242, at 92, 111.
283. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 265.
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as a crucial component in making a successful transition to a free market econ-
omy. 284 The legal foundation of the old communist banking system was very
weak in that it did not restrict itself by legal rules. 285 To change this history, the
new democratic Russia set about to reform the radical Central Bank Law and
Commercial Banking Law enacted in 1990.286
The new Russian legislation has two primary goals: (1) to institute a truly
independent central bank; and (2) to give this bank the ability to supervise and
regulate lower-level commercial banks as well as to carry out monetary and loan
policy. 287 The goal concerning central bank independence is especially noteworthy
since this is the first time the central bank is independent from the executive
government's control. 288 This radical departure from old laws safeguards the
positions of top bankers against political shifts and influence.289
Also noteworthy is the fact that the new banking laws distinctively define the
role of the Central Bank in Russia not as a fiscal agent of the government. 290
The new laws expressly prohibit the Central Bank from financing any government
debt.291 Under communism, the bank simply printed new money to cover the
deficit.292 At least in theory, the new banking laws create an independent Central
Bank.293
Despite the seemingly strong provisions stated above, ensuring that the Central
Bank is independent requires such measures as creating its own monetary and
284. See id. Russian businesses today demand even further changes in banking laws. See Malyshev,
supra note 273, at 161.
285. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 265.
286. See id.; see also Malyshev, supra note 273, at 161-62.
287. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 266.
288. See id. This independence is the first of its kind since the creation of a state bank in Russia
over 130 years ago. See id.; see also Malyshev, supra note 273, at 161-62 (discussing the achievements
of the new regulatory framework established by the Central Bank of Russia). The law states that
the Central Bank of Russia is accountable to the Russian Supreme Soviet, but not the executive and
administrative entities of the government. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 266 (Central Bank Law,
art. 1). Under communism, the entity that served as the central bank acted as a subordinate entity.
See id. The new laws call for the nomination of the central bank chairman to be named by the
Supreme Soviet, as opposed to members of the executive branch. See id. (Central Bank Law, art.
37). The new law was tested when the provisional government dismissed the government, particularly
the Central Bank Chairman, after a 1991 coup. See id. at 267. This action was determined to be
illegal and the Chairman was eventually reinstated. See id. See generally POLITICS OF THE WORLD,
supra note 1, at 804-05.
289. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 267
290. See id. (Central Bank Law, art. 17). Before such laws, the Central Bank financed the govern-
ment's budget deficit directly through zero-percent interest rates, with no collateral requirements
and no payment schedule. See id.
291. See id. The new laws set a maximum debt limit for certain agencies of the government. See
id. (Central Bank Law, art. 17). In the case of the Ministry of Finance, a previous abuser of the
Bank, the entity can only obtain loans on the same general terms as other debtors. See id.; see also
Malyshev, supra note 273, at 161.
292. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 267.
293. See id.
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credit-issuing policies. 294 To create a regulatory scheme, Russian legislators next
focused on the regulatory relationship between the Central Bank and the lower
commercial banks.295
Under the new laws, commercial banks must obtain a license from the Central
Bank. 296 This license lists the types of services each bank may provide. 297 The
Central Bank has the right to revoke these licenses when commercial banks act
improperly .29 Any Russian citizen or even foreigner may establish a commercial
bank, assuming all requirements are met. 299 Foreigners must meet a few additional
requirements, but such openness is a first in Russia.30 Lastly, the new laws
prescribe certain requirements that all commercial banks must meet, such as




While the Central Bank takes an active role in the affairs of commercial banks,
it is prohibited from getting too involved in the day-to-day exercises of the com-
mercial banks. 30 2 Despite this prohibition, the Central Bank maintains enough
power over commercial banks to ensure that the laws of the new Russia and its
economic goals are being carried out properly.3 °3
2. Bankruptcy Laws
Under communism, the government owned everything and planned the opera-
tions of almost every economic player. 304 The centralized economy guaranteed
an "artificially stable economy. 305 For example, banks were subsidized when
not making profits. 3° Such consistency lent a false sense of stability and expecta-
tion for both enterprises and the public as a whole.30 7 Statistically, the health of
294. See id.
295. See id. at 268; see also Malyshev, supra note 273, at 212-13.
296. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 268 (Central Bank Law, art. 23 and Commercial Banking
Law, art. 11).
297. See id. Allowing only certain services at commercial banks follows most Western banking
systems. See id. This provision is especially reminiscent of Swiss banking laws. Id. (referencing
PETER NOBEL, Rules of Conduct for Swiss Banks, in TRENDS AND FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING
LAW 83, 87 (Boston University ed., 1990)).
298. See id. at 269.
299. See id. at 268 (Commercial Banking Law, art. 13).
300. See id. Additional requirements are placed on foreign entities to ensure that the Bank's
articles of incorporation do not run counter to any Russian laws and that there are sufficient financial
resources to fund the endeavor. See id. at 268.
301. See id. at 270 (Central Bank Law, art. 24 and Commercial Banking Law, art. 24). For an
example of U.S. capital reserves, see Shaw & Rowlett, supra note 242, at 101-05.
302. See Vysman, supra note 281, at 270 (Central Bank Law, art. 22).
303. See id. at 269.
304. See Michael Kim, Note, When Nonuse is Useful: Bankruptcy Law in Post-Communist Central
and Eastern Europe, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043 (1996).
305. Id; Gerlach, supra note 117, at 83-84.
306. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1043.
307. See id.
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the economy was grossly distorted.0 8 Centralization produced two very distinct
results: (1) full employment; and (2) the absence of bankruptcies. 3°9
Since business under communism was not profit driven, and because the state
would always subsidize any losses, economic players were not financially disci-
plined.31° Basic market principles such as competition and profit maximization
were ignored.3 ' After the revolutions, transition meant that these economies
would not only enjoy positive aspects of a market economy, but also the pitfalls
and rigors of such a system.312 In this system, it is natural to have winners and
losers.31 3
a. Development of Bankruptcy Laws
A modem bankruptcy system should achieve seven main purposes. It should:
(1) provide a mechanism to deal with failed entities; (2) provide for the equitable
and predictable treatment of creditors; (3) maximize asset recovery; (4) provide
practical opportunities for reorganization in an appropriate case where creditor
interests and social needs are better met by maintaining the debtor in operation
than by liquidating said debtor; (5) give the honest debtor an opportunity for a
fresh economic start after financial failure; (6) pressure inefficient and insolvent
entities to voluntarily reallocate resources; and (7) further privatization efforts
through liquidation.314 In order for such goals to be met and for bankruptcy laws
to truly take hold, post-communist countries must develop and sustain newly
born market economies and commercial legal systems. 315 A significant aspect of
establishing a market economy depends in large part upon a solid legal framework
that encompasses the rights of the players as well as a structure in which transac-
tions can occur.316 While government policies and the development of financial
308. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 84.
309. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1044; Gerlach, supra note 117, at 84. See generally B.W.
Roelvink, Security Interest in the Czech Republic, in THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAW IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE 564-65 (George Ginsburgs et
al. eds., 1996).
310. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 84; Kim, supra note 304, at 1044.
311. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1044; Gerlach, supra note 117, at 84. Under a capitalist system,
scarce resources are used in the manner most efficient-resulting in the insolvency of inefficient
entities. See id. at 85.
312. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1045.
313. See id. at 1046.
314. See The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, Bankruptcy Law in European Countries Emerging
from Communism: The Special Legal and Economic Challenges, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 459, 462 n. 19
(1996) (providing a more detailed analysis of the different legal systems of the countries comprising
Eastern and Central Europe under communism as well as before communism) (quoting Henry N.
Schiffman, Financial Transactions for Lawyers, Introduction to ION TURCU, Reorganizarea Si
Lichidarea Judiciara 5, 6 (1996)); Gerlach, supra note 117, at 90-91.
315. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 463. See generally Gerlach, supra note 117, at 85.
316. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 462.
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institutions are important, it is the legal system that will provide the cornerstone
for a sustainable market economy.
3 17
Ironically, even young and immature bankruptcy laws can aid in the implemen-
tation and establishment of a sustainable market economy.318 Some commentators
go so far as to argue that if post-communist transitions are to succeed, bankruptcy
law restructuring is just as critical and necessary as laws regarding banking
regulation and securities. 3t9 Bankruptcy, in this sense, is considered the "final
market corrective."
320
The basic civil law in post-communist countries is based on civil codes, which
are in large part modeled after the French and German codes.321 In addition to
codes, the legal system must also include laws of specific subject areas, bank-
ruptcy being one of these.322 While bankruptcy law is only one among a varied
list, it is in this realm that a commercial system for post-communist countries
gains its momentum. 323 Bankruptcy law leads the transition in many ways because
of its close connection to privatization as a means beyond a market in which
numerous businesses are already insolvent.324
321Privatization is one of the first steps toward establishing a market economy.
No voluntary buying or selling can occur until the general public has the right
to own and exercise control over its own property.326 Bankruptcy law helps to
restructure markets.327 It does so by "taking assets from insolvent or near-
insolvent ('nonviable') enterprises and funneling the assets to profit-making enter-
prises. -328 Additional steps are required in establishing a market economy, since
a capitalist infrastructure is necessary, 329 but it is perhaps in the privatization
process of state-owned enterprises that bankruptcy law may play its most im-
portant role.
330
317. See id. at 463. The former legal systems of Eastern Europe must be replaced by "laws 'appro-
priate to the requirements of a state based on the rule of law and those of a market economy.' "Klaudt,
supra note 85, at 317 (for a definition of rule of law, see Hendley, supra note 146, at 41)).
318. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 463; Gerlach, supra note 117, at 89-90. See generally Klaudt,
supra note 85, at 307 n.18.
319. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1047.
320. Gerlach, supra note 117, at 90.
321. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 463 n.22.
322. See id. at 463.
323. See id. For an example of Czech laws, see Roelvink, supra note 309, at 564-65.
324. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 463.
325. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1045.
326. See id.
327. See id. Under communism, failure was impossible, thus making the emergence of bankruptcy
a forced restructuring of the market. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 89. See also Scott Horton,
The Death of Communism and Bankruptcy Reorganization, 1994 ABI J. LExis 2645, col. 1.
328. Kim, supra note 304, at 1045.
329. See id.
330. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 464. It must be noted that the method of privatization used
by each country in Eastern Europe greatly affects the specific bankruptcy laws implemented in each
country. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 91.
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Post-communist countries are implementing bankruptcy laws at a rapid pace,
due to the highly technical and complex nature of this area of the law.331 The
intermingling of legal and economic consequences of these laws are best left to
attorneys.332 Most elected officials are not attorneys, and therefore simply do
not understand technicalities of these laws.333 Thus, these laws are often neutral
political issues. 334 Along these same lines, "bankruptcy is a system of law that
has no existing vested interests of substantial consequence. . . so that changing
the bankruptcy law does not step on very many toes of substantial players in the
present legal or economic structure. " 335 Another reason for rapid development
in this area is that bankruptcy laws can often be revised and revamped without
having to change previous bodies of law.336 In most instances, it is not necessary
to create new institutions to administer these laws.337
Domestic circumstances are not the only impetus behind rapidly developing
bankruptcy laws in post-communist countries; there exists substantial interna-
tional pressure as well.338 International lending institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank often condition loans on bank-
ruptcy reform.339 Other international influences include the United States Agency
for International Development (USAiD), 340 which has sponsored valuable pro-
grams on bankruptcy law creation and reform in post-communist countries.
These programs attempt to educate local judges about how to administer bank-
ruptcy laws and about basic accounting and business practices so as to render
appropriate decisions in regard to business reorganizations.
331. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 464. For an example of Russian bankruptcy laws specifically,
see Horton, The Death of Communism, supra note 327, col. 5.
332. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 464.
333. See id.
334. See id. This is a general statement that ignores the possibility that certain elected officials
might raise some questions concerning state-owned entities. Id.
335. Id.
336. See id. German bankruptcy laws have proven to be a useful resource for much of Eastern
Europe. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 90.
337. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 464.
338. See id. Western advisors consider bankruptcy laws a vital component of transition. See
Gerlach, supra note 117, at 90.
339. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 464. See also Klaudt, supra note 85, at 344-48. The IMF
has developed a complex system of procedures and conditions placed on countries who wish to
receive monetary aid. See PoLiTics OF THE WORLD, supra note 1, at 449.
340. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 465. The USAID administers roughly one-third of the U.S.
foreign aid budget. See id. at 465 n.28.
341. See id. at 465. In 1993, the USAID program evolved out of a grant to Deloitte & Touche,
L.L.P. See id. at 465 n.29. The firm was charged with three projects: (1) to report on the existing
bankruptcy laws in post-communist countries (ten countries in the initial phase, consisting of Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slov-
enia); (2) to present a summary of the current laws to each country with respect to the entire region;
and (3) to conduct week-long judicial training sessions in each country on bankruptcy law (the sessions
were required to have small student to teacher ratios). See id.
342. See id. at 465.
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b. Use of Bankruptcy Laws
While the development of bankruptcy law has been rapid, this does not translate
into the its widespread use in post-communist countries.3 43 Research from 1996
reveals that bankruptcies were just beginning to be filed, 3" with most of these
filings involuntary.345
Some of the more successful transition economies-countries like the Czech
Republic, Hungary, and Poland-have met with some success regarding the im-
plementation of bankruptcy codes.3" In the Czech Republic, for example, the
number of creditor-initiated bankruptcies has dramatically increased. 347 By 1994,
over 1,592 bankruptcy petitions were filed.348 In Hungary, laws were once
weighted so much in favor of bankruptcy that in 1992, 14,000 bankruptcy petitions
were filed. 34'
Despite the success of a handful of countries, much of the Eastern European
region still faces numerous problems in bankruptcy implementation; for example,
financial responsibility for bankrupt state-owned entities is difficult to divide and
assign.35° Commentators suggest that the economies in these countries still lack
incentives to force insolvent businesses to file for bankruptcy, 35' with the threat
of financial failure not yet real in the minds of managers and owners.352 Culture,
and a history where short-term liquidity and long-term profitability played no
353role, both account for this skewed business mindset in an open market economy.
The limited use of bankruptcy disturbs some western advisors. 3 4 It is assumed
by many that the nonuse of bankruptcy law translates into a poor transition
economy.355 Understandably, many commentators disagree and cite other, more
gradual, restructuring mechanisms.356 This second camp explains that an environ-
343. See id. In Russia, for example, some reasons why bankruptcy law has not been widely used
include: (1) cultural resistance and fears about bankruptcy; (2) no fundamental basis of property and
commercial law; (3) a reluctance to go to court; and (4) the fear of social and political consequences.
See Sidney B. Brooks, A New Insolvency for Russia, 1995 ABI J. LExis 22, col. 3.
344. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 465.
345. See id.
346. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 83. For specific details on the individual bankruptcy codes
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, see id. at 92-106.
347. See id. at 92 (see Bankruptcy and Composition Act).
348. See id. at 92 n.74.
349. See id. at 97.
350. See id.
351. See id. Since employment is already at especially high levels in Eastern Europe, closing
down more businesses would create even higher levels of unemployment, making the option of
bankruptcy not terribly popular from a social standpoint. See Klaudt, supra note 85, at 303-04.
352. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 465. To a lesser extent, this comment also applies to the
attitudes of creditors. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 90.
353. See Bufford, supra note 314, at 465.
354. See Kim, supra note 304, at 1047.
355. See id. at 1048.
356. See id. Some mechanisms do exist that might render bankruptcy laws unnecessary. See id. at
1069. Restructuring can take place through various domestic and foreign means. To avoid bankruptcy
proceedings on the domestic front, post-communist countries have tried to improve credit-worthiness
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ment conducive to capitalist behavior must exist before bankruptcy law can be
used as a regular economic tool. 357 Beyond Eastern Europe, as this region contin-
ues to evolve as a player in the global marketplace, transnational bankruptcies
will become more of an issue. 358 Finely-tuned bankruptcy codes in these countries
can only increase global acceptance and economic well-being in the future.
V. Other Areas in Need of Legal Reform
While this article has discussed the crucial legal reforms being pursued in the
banking and bankruptcy sectors, other areas of law-such as securities, foreign
investment, tax, contract, property, and antitrust-require attention as well. Be-
yond the economic realm, areas such as criminal law also demand reform.359
Encompassing all legal reform is the issue of establishing the proper legal infra-
structures in these countries. The existence of an independent, trusted, and much-
used judiciary is one such institution. 360 All of these elements must be in place
if true reform is to occur in a successful manner. Reform is not a stagnant entity,
but instead an ongoing process that requires constant revision and testing. Below
is a brief discussion of contract and foreign investment laws as they tangentially
relate to banking and bankruptcy.
A. CONTRACT LAW
There exists a great need to procure an efficient and reliable method of enforcing
agreements in Eastern Europe. 361 From an economic standpoint, formulating a
working legal reform in this area is necessary if the newly embraced open market
and contain inflation. See id. at 1069. To achieve these goals such countries can: (1) encourage
lenders and borrowers to work out as much bad debt as possible, and if impossible, cut out or
recapitalize such debt through established public entities; (2) centralize government aid to select state
owned entities to prepare them for privatization (in this sense some industry sectors may be wholly
exempt from bankruptcy options); and (3) initiate "pre-privatization," which involves restructuring
and reworking the balance sheets of larger state-owned entities that had been distorted under commu-
nism. Id. at 1069-71. It is assumed that such mechanisms outside of bankruptcy gradually can help
establish capitalist behavior. See id. at 1071. New "informal codes of behavior" must be advanced
to help government, investors, managers, and the general citizenry learn "to utilize assets in the
most efficient way and steer these assets towards profit-generating entities." Id. Foreign investment
has been another tool outside of bankruptcy. See id. at 1072. Such investment provides ready capital
and impetus in restructuring the private sector. Id.
357. See id. at 1047. See generally Bufford, supra note 314, at 462-64.
358. See Gerlach, supra note 117, at 104-05 (analyzing of harmonization of cross-border bank-
ruptcy proceedings).
359. See generally Mike Cormaney, RICO in Russia: Effective Control of Organized Crime or
Another Empty Promise?, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 261 (1997); Heller, supra note
125, at 643-45.
360. See generally Boylan, supra note 72.
361. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 1. See also Greenspan, supra note 9, at 8-10; Kathryn Hendley,
The Role of Law in the Russian Economic Transition: Coping With the Unexpected in Contractual
Relations, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 624 (1996).
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economies in Eastern Europe are expected to succeed.13 62 Leading economic histo-
rian Douglass North professes that "[hiow effectively agreements are enforced
is the single most important determinant of economic performance. -363
The positive aspect of contract law is that it is easier to reform than many
other areas because the contracting parties are engaged in a positive sum game.3M
While parties to a contract are not exempt from disputes, it is important that they
at least began their union peacefully and with similar interests.365 Both usually
maintain an interest to resolve the dispute quickly and efficiently. 36
Much debate abounds on how post-communist countries should draft their new
contract laws. What influences should be taken into account? While the details
are worked out over time, it is necessary to understand that business will take
place before a succinct and final contract law is formed and implemented in these
emerging democratic countries.367 In truth, these economies are moving forward
regardless. As privatization continues, more transactions will find themselves
under the newly developed scope of contract law.365
In many contract cases, the law may be unnecessary.3 69 Such may be the case
if private parties learn to use self-enforcing contract mechanisms.370 Alternative
362. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 1. While contract laws, specifically such bodies of law as the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), are not new to Eastern Europeans per se (prior to the modern
revolution, Russian academics narrowly studied the U.C.C. for dealings in international affairs),
only recently has there been the practical need to study such bodies of law. See Alexander S. Komarov,
The Uniform Commercial Code: A Russian Point of View, 29 Loy. L.A. L. RaV. 1085 (1996).
363. Rubin, supra note 56, at 3 (quoting Douglass North, Institutions, Ideology and Economic
Performance, It CATO J. 477, 481 (1991) (reviewing the benefits of both informal agreement-
enforcing mechanisms and formal legal mechanisms to this end)). See also Komarov, supra note
362, at 1089.
364. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 3.
365. See id. at 4.
366. See id.
367. See id. at 5. See generally Komarov, supra note 362, at 1085-89. Still, all businesspersons
desire better contract laws, because unlike in the West where a signed contract has the force of law
and is usually backed by force, a contract in Eastern Europe usually means nothing more than
someone's autograph. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 9.
368. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 5. Contract rights enforcement is easier and more valuable
when property rights are clearly defined. See id. This can prove difficult in countries where public
ownership was the norm and private rights were non-existent. See id. While more recent laws have
been enacted regarding contracts specifically, questions still remain as to whether courts of Eastern
European countries function to enforce contracts and if businesspeople really rely on such tools. See
Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in Russia's Market Economy, 18 MIcH. J. INT'L
L. 59 (1996).
369. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 4.
370. See id. Unfortunately though, parties to contracts are not always able to provide for all
contingencies. See THOMAS F. MICEU, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 71 (1997). As a result, occasions
will arise when one party to the contract "no longer values performance" under the contract as
written, but provision was made in advance for this eventuality. Id. See generally Neil F. O'Donnell
& Kirill Y. Ratnikov, Dispute Resolution in the Commercial Law Tribunals ofthe Russian Federation:
Law and Practice, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 795 (1997).
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dispute resolution mechanisms also can limit the use of sparse judicial system
resources in these countries.371
B. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS
Despite the slow speed of reform and problems encountered during transition,
the transformation of former communist countries will prove to be a success for
both the East and West.372 In Eastern Europe, the global economy finds a wealth
of resources in new people and new natural resources.373 The investment opportu-
nities are unlimited.374
Foreign direct investment functions as a crucial stimulant in post-communist
economies. 37' The legal systems of these countries can have a fundamental
role in either encouraging or discouraging outside investment.376 Under com-
munism, foreign investment was illegal in most countries.377 Eastern Europe
was in essence cut off from the global economy. Since the fall of communism,
post-communist countries have radically changed their policies, opening wide
the doors to foreign investment.375 Since 1989, foreign investment has risen
from negligible amounts to almost $10 billion by 1993.379 Commentators esti-
mate that the Russian Federation alone has the potential to bring in over $75
billion in foreign investment.3 0
371. See Rubin, supra note 56, at 4-5. See generally Halverson, supra note 368, at 60-61, 109-11:
Arno Vicic, Lawyers and Arbitration: Attorneys and Arbitration in Croatia, 2 CROAT. ARBIT. YEARB.
195, 196-200 (1995).
372. See Greenspan, supra note 9, at 14.
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 1 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1995).
376. See id.
377. See id. at 3.
378. See id.; see also David F. Black, So You Want to Invest in Russia? A Legislative Analysis of
the Foreign Investment Climate in Russia, 5 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123 (1996). Foreign investment
constitutes more than capital outlay alone. See id. Foreign investment also means the entry of foreign
technology, which proves most beneficial in the newly emerging market economies of Eastern Europe.
See id.
379. See Gray & Jarosz, Law and Regulation, supra note 375, at 3. To aid greater foreign
investment, countries such as the United States team up with such countries as Russia to form
organizations that promote and guarantee investments between the countries. See Black, supra note
378, at 137. Even countries such as Bulgaria, which has had an incredibly difficult transition period,
are not without foreign investment potential. See David A. Levy, Bulgarian Trade and Investment:
A Realistic Assessment, 27 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 203, 244 (1995); Youlian Simidjiyski, A
Comparative Study of the Bulgarian Law on Foreign Investment and the Foreign Investment Laws
of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic Through the Prism of the World Bank Guidelines for
Treatment of Foreign Investment, 9 FLA. J. INrr'L L. 277, 278 (1994).
380. See Gray & Jarosz, Law and Regulation, supra note 375, at 6. Russia is especially targeted
for foreign investment because of the country's enormous reserves of raw materials and extremely
educated and cheap workforce. See Black, supra note 378, at 123; see also O'Donnell & Ratnikov,
supra note 370, at 795.
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Despite the rather positive numbers, the level of foreign investment is only a
small percentage of what is needed.3S' Some countries in the region have recently
been undergoing depressed economic conditions considered worse than those of
the United States during the Great Depression of 1928.382 Legal reform has played
a tremendous role in turning around and jump-starting these economies.383 Foreign
investment laws have also been supplemented by reforms in business law, bank-
ruptcy law, and tax law. 8
Regarding foreign investment laws in general, four topics claim priority: (1)
repatriation of profits; (2) tools for entry of investments; (3) expropriation; and
(4) arbitration mechanisms. 385 The legal treatment of these four topics is most
likely to influence a foreign investor's decision on whether to invest.386 Above
all, foreign investors seek confidence in the laws of a country, needing acknowl-
edgment that their investments will be protected and recognized. 387 In sum, post-
communist countries must continue to send strong signals to foreign investors
through legal reforms that reveal Eastern Europe's desire to be a global business
partner.
VI. Conclusion
Never before has lawmaking been done on such a grand scale as in Eastern
Europe over the past eight or nine years. The ability of post-communist countries
to make a successful transition to market economies and democracy will depend
in large part on the new legal systems put into place. A solid market economy
depends upon a solid legal framework that addresses the rights of the players
and the structure in which transactions can occur. All of Eastern Europe must
continue to dismantle old political, economic, and legal institutions based on
bankrupt, centrally-planned economies.
The old legal systems are now obsolete, as they were used only as political
instruments of communist governments. The new legal systems must be estab-
lished based on constitutionalism and the rule of law, offering predictable rules
of behavior that apply to all participants equally. Law reformers do not, however,
381. See Gray & Jarosz, Law and Regulation, supra note 375, at 6. While more foreign investment
is needed in Eastern Europe, it is important to remember that too much foreign investment can work
to the detriment of the local citizens of the country accepting the investments.
382. See id.
383. See id. at 3.
384. See generally Todd Ewing, The Treaty With Poland Concerning Business and Economic
Relations: Does It Provide More Incentive to the American Investor?, 11 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 352,
353 (1990). See also Black, supra note 378, at 134 (example of Russia amending its tax laws to be
more attractive to foreign investors).
385. See Ewing, supra note 384, at 352.
386. See id.
387. See generally Gray & Jarosz, Law and Regulation, supra note 375, at 1. See also Vladimir
F. Popondopulo (translated by Edward R. Brown), The Legal Regulation of Foreign Investment in
Russia, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 599, 600 (1994); see also Black, supra note 378, at 124-25.
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have the luxury of a blank page upon which to write new laws. The constraints
of history and economic reality serve as boundaries. Nevertheless, legal systems
can establish a skeleton upon which to build a functioning market economy.
Crucial to transition are such areas of the law as privatization, banking, and
bankruptcy. Foreign investment and contract law reform are also vital in the
business realm.
Since the break with communism, most Eastern European countries have insti-
tuted new and reformed laws in these areas. While some have met with greater
success than others, roughly all still remain committed to some variation of a
market economy. Stability and efficiency will hopefully come with time. Until
then, the region unfortunately continues to teeter between economic transforma-
tion and civil strife. No matter how well new laws and modifications are written,
implementation and consistency will continue to plague these transformations.
These countries have great potential if only they can successfully evolve out of
their broken communist pasts.
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